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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

THE UNITED STATES

CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION
Governments, industry, ordinary citizens and environmental
organizations all recognize the existence of environmental
problems. However, this realization has not led to practical results
necessary to protect the environment. It is imperative that the
nations of the world, individually and collectively, take measures
to ensure that environmental world stability is maintained.
This article discusses the use of negotiated agreements and
covenants as a primary tool to achieve realistic solutions to
environmental problems. Such solutions may not always be highly
beneficial in the short run but may at least be a solid basis for
further discussion and an incentive for cooperation in the long run.
Part One discusses the need for sustainable development. Part Two
provides an overview of international developments that have led to
a current awareness of the need to take measures to manage our
environment to ensure both industrial development and
environmental sustainability. Part Three will take a closer look at
how the Netherlands attempts to solve the problem of environmental
desecration through the unique use of covenants to secure industrial
compliance with the government's goals of achieving sustainable
development. Finally, Part Four investigates how the United States
can achieve a balance between negotiated agreements and
governmentally conceived rules, and suggests ways covenants could
be used in the future, both nationally and internationally.
II. THE NEED FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Most national environmental laws have been influenced by
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international agreements and (in)direct pressure from the
international community through Conventions and Treaties.' It was
not until the second half of this century that a concern for the
environment began gaining clout, and nongovernmental
organizations and citizen groups began fueling a general awareness
for protecting the environment. Historically, unconditional
industrial development had been good for the country, and anyone
who raised environmental concerns was accused of crying wolf.
The need to protect one's immediate environment was effected
largely through local nuisance actions, seeking enforcement against
neighbors or neighboring polluting industries. 2 The term
"sustainable development" is therefore not new. What is new is
that a workable compromise between industry and the general
public is being generated, whereby both hope to benefit, provided
a common interpretation of the concept can be found. But good
intentions, as displayed at the U.N. Conference in Rio de Janeiro, 3
are not enough-legal environmental principles which are
enforceable in a court of law are needed.
These principles, or covenants, must be adhered to by all
countries to further a plan designed to achieve a clean and healthy
environment, yet still maintain room for industrial development.
Industries, in compluing with enforceable principles such as emission standards, will need to invest vast sums of money, and thus
require strict guidelines in order to calculate cost and enable longterm planning. It, therefore, follows that in promulgating such
standards, governments need to take into account the technical and
economic capability of industries to ultimately comply with such
1. See generally VERZUL, J.H.W., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
(M. Bos, ed., 1968). This is specifically the case in the
Netherlands, where the precedence of international law is assured by the
constitution and automatically superior to conflicting national law.
PERSPECTIVE,

2. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
(judgment allowing permanent damages to landowners alleging injury to property
from neighboring cement plant).
3. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
June 1992.
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standards. If standards are promoted in a vacuum or without
adequate regard for industry, unnecessary litigation would likely
ensue. 4 On the other hand, if industries will necessarily err on the
side of caution as to what is achievable, the need for experts
outside the industrial sphere will be required. Finally, necessary
parties in the negotiations will have to be professional
environmental groups, if only to supply a reasonable balance. In
an ideal world, these parties can reach a compromise that would
not even require legal enforcement. In a realistic world, however,
such compromises will need the backup of either legislation, or the
security of a contract, enforceable in a court of law or equity.
The realization that the environment needs to be managed
carefully will require a change in economic thinking. This may
entail the practical realization that natural resources represent
economic and financial values beyond the mere cost of harvesting
and production; that such natural resources are depletable; and that
we cannot continue to spend the capital of this world without
usurping the right of future generations to enjoy the use of such
capital.5 Such realization will necessitate international resource
management through integrated legal and administrative systems.
It is unrealistic to expect industries to voluntarily promote measures
that will, at least initially, lead to higher cost and lower profits.
4. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C.Cir.
1973) (remand for further proceedings where automobile manufacturers
established that technology for compliance was not available within the meaning
of the Clean Air Act).
5. For two recent and extensive studies in this field, see MICHAEL CARLEY and
IAN CHRISTIE, MANAGING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1992) and MICHAEL
REDCLIFT, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EXPLORING THE CONTRADICTIONS,

For an early study, see WOUTER VAN DIEREN AND MARIUS G. W.
HUMMELINCK, NATUUR Is DUUR, OVER DE WAARDE VAN DE NATUUR (NATURE
Is DEAR, ABOUT THE VALUE OF NATURE) (1977).
(1992).

6. See

MINISTERIE VAN VOLKSHUISVESTING, RUIMTELIJKE ORDENING EN
MILIEUBEHEER, MINISTERIE VAN LANDBOUW EN VISSERIJ [MINISTRY OF LAND,
HOUSING AND ENVIRONMENT, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE], Ch. 5, Paving the
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Consequently, governmental action is required to force an industry
to comply with measures that will ensure a cleaner and healthier
environment. This does not mean that industrial interests should
be sideswiped, or that we should protect the environment regardless
of the cost. As Kenneth T. Derr, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer of Chevron Corp., notes:
[i]ncreasingly, we're spending vast sums for
negligible-or in some cases negative--environmental
gains. In such cases, the economic benefits of the
pollution control business are extremely dubious...
We're learning that energy, environment, and
economic development are three basic human needs.
Our policy should aim not for a tradeoff among them
but for a synthesis among them.7
International cooperation is necessary to achieve unity in
standards and to ensure that countries which do attempt to enforce
strict environmental standards will not suffer financially.
Interestingly, it seems that stringent regulations do not bother
companies, provided they are imposed worldwide. Robert Bott
emphasizes the necessity of incorporating sustainable development
into the Canadian method of business:
By contrast, at least one major oil service and
supply company has chosen Holland as the site for
research and development of "green" drilling fluids,
because the tidy Dutch have the toughest regulations
in this area. The lesson seems to be that our rules

way to sustainable development, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY PLAN: To
CHOOSE OR TO LOSF at 107 et seq., Parliament, Second Chamber, Sess. 1988-

1989, 21 137, nos. 1-2, for a discussion of various economic and environmental
scenarios. [hereinafter NEPP].

7. Kenneth T. Derr, Chevron's Derr: Beware the Cutting Edge, OIL & GAS J.,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 28, 30-31.
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have to be at least as stringent as any in the world
if we want to keep the hi-tech, high-value-added
industries here.'
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature's
Commission on Environmental Law [hereinafter IUCN] is currently
in the process of developing a world-covenant that furthers the
integrative framework, 9 as recommended by the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development assembled in Rio de
Janeiro in June 1992.10 The IUCN published a draft version in
1995. This covenant should at least include a chapter on the
settlement of disputes, preferably in an International (or
Environmental) Court of Justice." The question of which parties
would have access to such a court might spawn lengthy

8. Robert Bott, Don't Drop the Ball; There is Ample Evidence That Shows
SustainableDevelopment Must be IncorporatedInto Our Way ofDoing Business.
OILWEEK, Feb. 15, 1993, at 38.
9. Letter to the author, dated Oct. 6, 1993, and accompanying documents.
10. Overview of Agenda 21 and Implementation Mechanisms: Report of the
Secretary-Generalof the Conference, U.N. GAOR Preparatory Comm. for U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, 4th Plen. Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.151/PC/100/Add.1 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda Item 21].
11. At the biennial International Bar Association meeting on September 21, 1993
in Cannes, France, several legal experts argued for a separate Environmental
Court. Lord Chief Justice Harry Woolf of the Court of Appeal in London
recommended that authorities look at the example of the New South Wales Land
and Environmental Court in Australia as a model for both the United Kingdom
and Europe. The specialized court, which has been in existence for 10 years, has
been able to hear cases "within a time scale of three months" and provides expert
assessments through the technical expertise of its judges, he argued. Mr. Judson
Starr of the law firm of Venable Baetjer Howard & Civiletti in Washington, D.C.
thought that the establishment of a separate environmental court system was also
a "good idea," adding that it now takes up to two years to hear environmental
pollution cases in the United States. 15 INT'L ENvTL. REP. (BNA) 594 (Sept. 23,
1992).
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negotiations, as most governments would be wary of being sued by
any third-country citizen. Strict guidelines defining interested
parties will need to be developed as well as strict rules regarding
which parts of such a covenant should be enforceable by those
parties. At the same time it would be necessary to actually enforce
those judgments, which would require nations to surrender their
sovereignty. This process is not as unreal as it sounds, as
demonstrated by several sovereign European nations, members of
the European Community [hereinafter EC], which
submit
12
Courts.
European
the
of
jurisdiction
the
themselves to
However, before one can even think of enforcing worldwide environmental measures, individual states will need to have
practical measures in place, by legislation or otherwise, to ensure
that their populations enjoy the right to an environment and level
of development adequate for their health, well-being, and dignity.
Such measures will need to include effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy. As such,
it seems inevitable that effective promulgation of such measures
requires an agreement to be reached as to exact definitions. The
working group of the IUCN has proposed the following definition
of sustainable development:
Management of the human use, development,
conservation, protection,
maintenance and
enhancement of natural, physical and cultural
resources in a way or at a rate which enables people
and communities to provide for their social,

12. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R. 585. The European Court
of Justice ruled that although there is no supremacy clause in the E.C. treaties,
Community Law is supreme. The Court reasoned that the whole structure of the

Common Market would be at risk if national laws at variance with EC law could
be enacted: "The transfer by the states from their domestic legal systems to the
Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty

carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a
subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail." Id. at 586.
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economic and cultural well-being and for their
health and safety while:
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical
resources to meet the needs of future generations;
(b) using, developing or protecting renewable
natural and physical resources so that their ability to
yield long-term benefits is not endangered;
(c) using, developing or protecting non-renewable
natural resources so as to lead to an orderly and
practical transition to adequate substitutes including
renewable resources;
(d) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air,
water, soil and ecosystems; and
(e) avoiding, remedying or mitigating any adverse
13
effects of developments on the environment.
IH. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Stockholm 1972

After the rapid, industrial development of the post-World
War II era, the Sixties saw a growing concern for the environment
and the human role in this economic society. These concerns
eventually culminated in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human
Environment at Stockholm which brought industrialized and
developing nations together to delineate the rights of the human
family to a healthy and productive environment. 4 Unfortunately,

13. Letter to the author, dated Oct. 6, 1993.
14. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 and corr. 1 (1972), U.N. Sales No. E.73.lI.A.14 and corr.,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. The
objective of the Convention was to enumerate common principles to inspire and
guide the people of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human
environment. The Stockholm Declaration is generally seen as standing at the
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from the very beginning, the conference was divided between those
who saw the problem as pollution control versus those who
believed the problem was the practices of industrialized nations.
The developed world saw the primary concern of the conference as
"the human impact on the biophysical environment with emphasis
on control of pollution and conservation of resources." 15 Olaf
Palme, then Prime Miinister of Sweden, stressed this concern in his
opening address, and explained that his government attached "the
greatest importance to the stress laid in the declaration upon the
need for development." 6 Indira Ghandi, representing the other
viewpoint, believed poverty was the greatest polluter, and that it
was caused almost wholly by the exploitative practices of
developed nations. In an attempt to bridge these differences, the
concept was advanced that environmental protection was an
essential element of social and economic development:
Questioning development itself is taboo. For a start,
that would be suicide for the huge fraternity of
officials, experts, engineers, contractors, seed
merchants, purveyors of pesticides and fertilizers,
researchers, businessmen and politicians of north
and south who thrive on the industry. Besides,
development is part of our paradigm of unspoken
assumptions. We need to feel we have progressed
from our pre-industrial days and that the

basis of the development of international environmental law during the decades
which followed.
15. LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL
(2d ed. 1990). [hereinafter CALDWELL].

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, at 56

16. R. Stephen Berry et al., What Happened at Stockholm: A Special Report, 28
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS: BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.

1972, at 44.
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to go the same

Nevertheless, the 114 governments represented at Stockholm
agreed generally on a declaration of principles and an action
plan.' 8 Judged in terms of actual accomplishments and immediate
influence on the policies of world governments the Conference was
not very impressive. However, four factors made this Conference
different from previous U.N. Conferences: (1) the Conference,
from its preparatory stage on, was action-oriented and was meant
to lead to results rather than statements; (2) parties aimed to work
out differences rather than let them disrupt the Conference; (3)
there was active participation and interest by Non-Governmental
Organizations [hereinafter NGOs] (even though their influence may
not have been great, the fact that the Swedish Government
provided accommodations for the non-governmental
"Environmental Forum" to convene at the same time gave many
NGOs from different countries a chance to meet, address common
concerns, and, through the media, make their concerns heard);19
(4) perhaps most important, the United Nations Environment
Program [hereinafter UNEP] was established.20
The result was that for the first time the environment was
17. Walter Schwarz, BEWARE THE RICHBEARING GIFTS: Wealthy countries
destroy far more than they create.... THE GUARDIAN, July 12, 1992, (Features),
at 27.
18. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 14.
19. See CALDWELL, supra note 15, at 56 et seq.
20. Implementing the recommendations of Stockholm for a United Nations
Environment Program, the U.N. General Assembly established the necessary
institutional and financial arrangement on December 15, 1972, reprintedin U.N.
GAOR, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/PV.2112, (1972), adopting Draft Res.
A/C.2/SR.1469 (A/8703/Add.1 (pt. II)). The purpose of UNEP was to serve as
a focal point for environment-related activities within the United Nations system.
The location of the UNEP secretariat was to be in Nairobi, Kenya.
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recognized as a subject of general international concern.
B.

The Aftermath

A string of meetings followed regarding the rights of people
to adequate food, sound housing, safe water and access to means
of choosing the size of their families. In the wake of Stockholm,
a variety of treaties were negotiated, and, primarily through the
work of the UNEP, opened for ratification.2"
It took ten years to act upon the growing concept of the
right of people's children to live in a healthy environment and to
acknowledge that the world's natural resources (the "environment")
needed to be sustained. This could only be realized through global,
The U.N. General Assembly
governmental measures.
commemorated the tenth anniversary of Stockholm by asking the
UNEP to convene a special session in Nairobi to make
recommendations with respect to future environmental trends,
perspectives, action, and international cooperation. This is all to be
addressed by UNEP during the next decade. 22
One of the practical results of these previous efforts was theWorld Charter for Nature 23 which was accepted by the General
Assembly. This Charter illustrates the international recognition of
the principles of Stockholm, as well as the practical difficulty of
making these principles operational in a world of sovereign states.

21. See generally CALDWELL, supra note 15, at 83-86.

22. Id. at 75-6.
23. Consideration and Adoption of the Revised World Charter for Nature,
Agenda Item 21, ProvisionalVerbatim Record of the Forty-eighth Meeting...
, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.48.5ee; Charterfor Nature, A/Res/37I7,9 reprintedin 22
I.L.M. 455 (1983). Texts reprinted in 10 ENVL. POL'Y & L. 30-31 (January
1983).
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The Charter was adopted by a 146-1 vote.24 Among the eighteen
Nations which abstained were the eight most notorious signatory
states to the Treaty of Amazonian Co-operation,25 under the
leadership of Brazil.26
C.

World Commission on Environment and Development

The other significant achievement was the World
Commission on Environment and Development, officially
established by the UN in 1983 [hereinafter The Brundtland
Commission]. Then Labor Party Leader Gro Harlem Brundtland of
Norway was asked to chair a special, independent commission to
address a global agenda for change. Her Agenda was four-fold:
* to propose long-term environmental strategies for
achieving sustainable development by the year 2000
and beyond;
• to recommend international co-operation between
developed and developing countries promoting
interrelationships between people, resources,
environment, and development;
* to consider ways and means by which the
international community could deal more effectively
with environmental concerns; and
* to define an action agenda, suggesting the
appropriate measures needed to deal successfully

24. The United States, which had experienced a major reversal of political
priorities with the election of Ronald Reagan, was the lone objector.
25. Treaty for Amazonian Co-operation, July 3, 1978, 49 I.L.M. 978. (entered
into force Feb. 2, 1980). The purpose of the treaty is to promote the harmonious
development of the Amazon region and permit equitable distribution of the
benefits of such development among the parties.
26. See CALDWELL, supra note 15, at 79, for a discussion of the possible
political motives behind the votes.
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with the problems of protecting and enhancing the
environment. 27
The Brundtland Commission was assisted in its review of
legal rights and principles by a group of international legal experts
under the Chairmanship of R.D. Munro. This group prepared a
report on legal principles for environmental protection and
sustainable development, as well as proposals for accelerating the
development of relevant international law.28
The Brundtland Commission realized from the beginning
that the problems related to the environment could no longer be
solved by isolated patchwork, but because most environmental
problems are linked across national boundaries, they could no
longer be addressed by "topical" solutions.2 9 Any attempt to
preserve the environment for the future must realize that
"environment" can no longer be seen as limited to "environmental
issues." However, ".... the 'environment' is where we all live;
'development' is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot
within that abode. The two are inseparable."3
The Commission selected eight key issues for analysis,
stressing that governments must begin "to make the key national,
economic, and sectoral agencies directly responsible and
accountable for ensuring that their policies, programs, and budgets
support development that is economically and ecologically

27. See Chairman'sForeword to THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE, (2d ed. 1991). [hereinafter OUR
COMMON FUTURE].
28. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AS ADOPTED BY THE EXPERTS GROUP ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT

(1987). [hereinafter

EXPERTS GROUP].

29. See OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 27.
30. Id. at XI.
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sustainable. '3 1
Addressing the legal implications of an
environmental program, encouraging and supporting sustainable
development, the Commission reported:
Governments now need to fill major gaps in existing
national and international law related to the
environment, to find ways to recognize and project
the right of present and future generations to an
environment adequate for their health and well
being, to prepare under UN auspices a universal
Declaration on environmental protection and
sustainable development and a subsequent
Convention, and to strengthen procedures for
avoiding or resolving disputes on environment and
resource management issues.31
D.

Rio 1992

In its final report, the Brundtland Commission advocated an
international convention on sustainable development. From June
3-14, 1992, more than 170 countries met in Rio de Janeiro for the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The
focus of this convention, held on the 20th anniversary of the
Stockholm Conference,33 was clearly on sustainable development,
as this concept had evolved from, among others, the Brundtland
Report. It is one thing, however, to publicly profess adherence to
the sustainability of our planet; it is quite another to actually
promulgate measures at home that will implement that principle.
Since 1972, nearly every country has adopted one or more pieces
of environmental legislation. In addition, there are more than 870

31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 21.
33. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 14.
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legal instruments in which at least some provisions are concerned
with environmental issues. The Rio Conference added an 800 page
Agenda 21, and several Declarations, Conventions, and
Important for international furtherance of
Statements.34
sustainable development was the fact that the participants agreed
to establish a new Commission for Sustainable Development to
monitor and review the implementation of Agenda 21. The
Commission will be an intergovernmental commission at the
ministerial level and will report to the United Nations Economic
and Social Council. NGOs will also have a role in the
Commission.
One of the countries that has adopted the report of the
Brundtland Commission is the Netherlands. Currently the Dutch
government is in the process of promulgating measures for
complying with the international requirements. In doing so, the
government -uses the unique concept of the covenant to secure
compliance by industries with the ultimate goal of an
environmentally clean and industrial nation.

IV. THE NETHERLANDS
As did most countries, by the time the Brundtland report was
published, the Netherlands had in place a variety of acts, largely
sectorial, which were usually applicable to specific target areas and
were mostly characterized by their total lack of coordination and
enforcement. Since the early eighties, attempts had been made to
remedy this confusion. These attempts culminated in the 1989
NATIONAL ENVmONMENTAL POLICY PLAN 35 [hereinafter NEPP]

and the Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer)

34. For an excellent discussion of the Rio Conference, see Edith Brown Weiss,
Introductory Note in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, Rio de Janeiro, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 814 (1992).
35. See NEPP, supra note 6.
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[hereinafter EMA], 36 as promulgated in March 1993.
immediate base of the NEPP was the Brundtland report:

[Vol. 4
The

Both the report of the Brundtland Commission and
'Concern for Tomorrow' 37 led to the conclusion
that, on the one hand, intensification and broadening
of environmental policy are urgently needed-and, on
the other hand safeguarding environmental quality
on behalf of sustainable development will be a
process that will last several decades. The longterm objectives in this NEPP are intended to provide
tentative direction to this process. 8
Since environmental legislation is mainly implemented at a
provincial level, the "Provincial Commissions for Environmental
and Water Management," to be formed under the new legislation,
will become ever more important.39
Both the ministries and the provinces are required to set
environmental plans to be revised every four years.' These plans
may be extended for a maximum of two years. Municipalities may

36. Wet Milieubeheer [ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ACT], Stb. 1988, nr. 133
(current version at Stb. 1992, nr 317 (1992)) [hereinafter EMA].
37.

CONCERN FOR TOMORROW, RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR VOLKSGEZONDHEID EN
MILIEUHYGIENE, RIVM, [NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION] (1988).

38. See NEPP, supra note 6.
39. See EMA, supra note 36, at ch. 2, § 2.3, art. 2.25 (1993).
40. See id. at ch. 4 (1993), PLANNEN (PLANS), § 4.2., HET NATIONALE
MILIEUBELEIDSPLAN (THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN) and
§ 4.4 HE PROVINCIALE MILIEUBELEIDSPLAN (THE PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT PLAN).
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draft their own plans but are not required to do so. 41 In addition,
each authority must annually draft an environmental program,
which contains an assessment of the plan.42 There is no
hierarchical relationship between the central, provincial, and
municipal government plans, and each authority must take into
account its own plan. But for strict coordination, it is obvious that
such a variety of organizational plans could lead to chaos and
conflicts with industry being left in limbo as to where to apply for
which permit. The EMA has thus created a Central Advisory
Body, in which representatives of environmental NGOs, employers'
and workers' unions, provincial and municipal governments, and
specialists advise the Coordinating Minister. 43
A.

Pernmits

Engaging in industrial activity in the Netherlands without a
permit is prohibited. Chapter 8 of the EMA explains in detail the
rules to be followed by the authorities when granting an EMA
permit, listing eleven criteria which the competent authority must
In
either "adhere to", "take into account", or "observe"."
practice, acquisition of a permit is a complicated procedure. At a
central level, several different ministries are involved in the
planning, such as Transport and Public Works for water
management, water pollution, and road building; Agriculture,
Nature Management, and Fisheries for agricultural issues;
Economic Affairs for energy and energy conservation issues; Social
Affairs and Employment for protection of employees at industrial
plants; Welfare, Public Health, and Culture for contaminants in
41. EMA, supra note 36, at ch. 4, § 4.6 HEr GEMEENTELUKE MILIEUBELEIDSPLAN
(THE MUNICIPAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN) (1993).
42. Id. at ch. 4, §§ 4.3, 5, 7 (1993).
43. Id. at ch. 2, § 2.1 (1993).
44. Id. at ch. 8, art. 8.8 (1993).
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foodstuffs; and Foreign Affairs for international issues. Since most
industrial activity will likely involve issues concerning more than
one Department, in theory, one permit may require negotiations
with several (competing) departments. In addition, if the permit is
granted, its conditions must also meet the "ALARA" principle,
which requires a company to take measures which keep emissions
"as low as reasonably achievable." 45 If all conditions have been
met, a permit may still be denied in the interest of protecting the
environment.
All permit applications, together with the draft permit, must
be made public. Often they are published in the local newspaper,
and they may be published in the Official Gazette (Staatscourant).
In addition they must be sent to the users of real property adjacent
to the area for which a permit was requested. Upon request, a
public hearing will be held, where anyone with an "environmental
interest" can object.46 Appeal can be taken by anyone who
objected initially to the draft permit or the application to the
Council of State (Raad van State).47 No property damage or
personal injuries are required--environmental interests are sufficient
and give third parties standing. The objector's nationality and
distance from the affected site are irrelevant for filing such an
objection, but usually distance will be a factor to be weighed by
the Council in arriving at a final decision. Distance, however, is
irrelevant in the case of an official environmental organization,
which only needs to file objections in conformity with their own
objectives, as laid down in their articles of association.
The Dutch policy departs from earlier requirements where
actual injury needed to be established before acquiring sufficient
standing to object. In fact, it comes very close to the proposal of
45. THE LAW OFFICES OF NAUTA DUTILH, ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
IN THE NETHERLANDS, 20 (March 1993). [hereinafter NAUTA DUTILH].
46. EMA, supra note 36, at ch. 13, § 13.2.3, Art. 13.17(1) ADVIEZEN EN
BEZWAREN (ADVICE AND OBJECTIONS) (1993).
47. Id. at ch. 20. BEROEP (APPEAL), § 20.1, art. 20.6(2) (1993).
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the Experts Group on Environmental Law as commissioned by the
Brundtland Commission,' whichproposed that "States shall provide
remedies for persons who have been or may be detrimentally
affected by a transboundary interference with their use of a
or by a transboundary
transboundary natural resource
48
interference.,
environmental
For persons to have transboundary access to the local court
system, a legal system needs to be in place to provide internally
affected persons such access. Treaties can later be put in place
with neighboring countries, extending these rights to citizens of
neighboring states. In an important case commenced by plaintiffs
G.J. Bier and the Reinwater Foundation, the Dutch Supreme
Court49 ruled that French potassium mines discharging salted
effluent into the Rhine, thereby causing damage to the nurseries in
the Netherlands "Westland" area, were entitled to use the river just
as the nurseries were, but that they had to take into account the
downstream interests. The French defendant, Potassium Mines,
objected that the courts of The Netherlands, including the
Arrondissementsrechtbank(Court of First Instance), did not have
jurisdiction in the matter. In a judgment delivered on May 12,

48. See EXPERTs GROUP, supra note 28, at art. 20; GENERAL PRINCIPLES
CONCERNING NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCES. See
also North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(1993) (Can.-Mex.-U.S.), art. 6, 22-26.

49. G. J. Bier B.V. et al. are engaged in the business of nursery gardening.
Because of the high salinity of the Rhine, Bier was obliged to take expensive
measures to limit it. The Reinwater Foundation exists in order to promote every
possible improvement in the quality of the water in the Rhine basin, especially
by opposing any deterioration in the natural quality of the water. The means
whereby it seeks to achieve the purpose consist in particular in bringing legal
actions so as to ensure the protection of the personal rights of all those whose
environment is affected by the quality of the water of the Rhine and, in
particular, of those whose livelihood is dependent upon it.
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1975, the Arrondissementsrechtbank held that it had no
jurisdiction 50 because the event that had caused the damage could
only be the discharge of the residuary salts into the Rhine in
France and, therefore, under the Brussels Convention, 1 the case
came under the jurisdiction of the French court.
On June 13, 1975, Bier and Reinwater lodged an appeal
against that judgment with the Gerechtshof(Appeals Court) of the
Hague, and requested a reconsideration of the lower court's
decision. Bier and Reinwater relied on Article 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention, which provides that a defendant domiciled in a
Contracting State may be sued in the place where the harmful
event occurred on matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict.
The Gerechtshof, Second Chamber, felt that the proper course was
to apply Article 2(2) and Article 3(2) of the Protocol of 3 June
1971 on the Interpretation by the European Court of Justice of the
Convention. Accordingly, by judgment of February 27, 1976, it
stayed the proceedings until the Court of Justice had given a
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of what is meant by, "the
place where the harmful event occurred" as stated in Article 5 (3)
of the Convention. In particular, it asked the Court to determine
whether the meaning is the place where the damage took place or
became apparent or rather the place where the act was or was not
performed. The Court held that:
[w]here the place of the happening of the event
which may give rise to liability in tort, delict or
quasi delict and the place where that event results in
damage are not identical, the expression 'place
50. Judgment of May 12, 1975 (Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier & De Stichting
Reinwater Foundation v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A.), Rb., Case 4230/74
(Neth.).
51. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and
Commercial Judgments, Sept. 27, 1968, July 28, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990)
reprinted in JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 673 (1992) [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
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where the harmful event occurred', in Article 5(3)
of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, must be understood
as being intended to cover both the place where the
damage occurred and the place of the event giving
rise to it.
The result is that the defendant may be sued, at the
option of the plaintiff, either in the courts for the
place where the damage occurred or in the courts
for the place of the event which gives rise to and is
at the origin of that damage. 2
The importance of this action is that it opens the door for foreign
plaintiffs to commence legal proceedings in the Netherlands (or any
other Member State), should they wish to do so. The EMA seems
not to exclude foreign plaintiffs from asserting standing in the
Netherlands for environmental injuries.
B.

Covenants

Even with a central coordinating agency in place, the permit
system is not the easiest way of ascertaining whether the industry
complies with all relevant current regulations or has in fact applied
for all applicable permits. Consequently, the EMA creates a
second option for allowing the government to achieve its
environmental goals--the covenant.
It is well established that the Dutch government may
conclude contracts in a civil capacity with regard to the exercise of

52. Case 2176, Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v Mines de Potasse d'Alsace
S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735 (preliminary ruling requested by the Gerechtshof of The
Hague).
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their discretionary powers under public law. 3 This power enables
the government to enter into voluntary agreements with industries.
The government cannot solve environmental problems on its own.
Therefore a "target group" policy was chosen to assure that special
attention was paid to priority target groups.5 4 The main aim is to
tackle environmental problems integrally by target group. Such
groups may consist of consumers, NGOs, the retail trade sector and
industrial sectors. In consultation with target groups, concrete
agreements are made about ways to execute and implement the
environmental targets. These agreements are called covenants.
Once the target groups have been defined, individual industrial
branches are invited to participate.5 Following this, an attempt
is made to determine an individual target plan for each participant.
Sometimes such groups are homogenous, with similar
environmental problems (e.g., gas stations), and a more or less
standard covenant may be worked out for all participants. On the
other hand, some groups, such as the primary metals industry, are
far more heterogeneous.
In those cases, the environmental
problems of each company may vary enormously. The aim is to
negotiate with each company within the group individually, having
the companies themselves propose workable plans to achieve the
goals as agreed with the target group as a whole and as laid out in

53. See NAUTA DUTILH, supra note 45, at 22.
54.
DE

WETENSCHAPPELIJKE RAAD VOOR HET REGERINGSBELEID, RAPPORTEN AAN
REGERING:
MILIEUBELEID,
STRATEGIE,
INSTRUMENTEN
EN

HANDHAAFBAARHEID, 41/1992 Ch. 4, at 121 et seq. (SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL FOR
GOVERNMENT PLANNING, REPORTS TO THE GOVERNMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL
PLANNING, STRATEGY, INSTRUMENTS AND REALIZATION) (1992).

55. Currently over 12,000 companies of more than 5 employees, comprising over
90 % of environmental accountability. See J.H.G. VAN DEN BROEK, DE ROL
VAN MILIEUCONVENANTEN BIJ DE VERLENING VAN EEN MILIEUVERGUNNING
(J.H.G. VAN DEN BROEK, ESQ., THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL COVENANTS IN

ISSUING ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS), in 5 Milieu en Recht 258 (mei 1992) (5

ENV'T & L. 258 [May 1992]).
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the covenant.56 Companies report annually to the government on
progress. Compliance with the plan serves as a basis for the
issuance of environmental permits, without which no company may
operate. If the relevant authorities are not satisfied with the
achieved results, then they may impose stricter conditions on the
applicable licenses. The company may lodge an appeal against the
decisions of the licensing authorities, and the issue will then be
whether the decision of the relevant authorities is justified when
judged against the background of the Declaration of Intent.57
The added advantage of this process is that the government
will obtain a direct insight of the viewpoints and opinions of an
industry regarding its environmental goals before it enacts final
legislation. Furthermore, the negotiated covenants may take the
place of formal legislation. Since environmental standards are
usually costly to implement, it may be taken for granted that an
industry will only comply with restrictive regulations if they are
ultimately beneficial to the industry or if they are imposed through
legislation.58
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that an elaborate system is
in place to implement and enforce environmental standards which
require companies to comply upon penalty of law, several
arguments can be made for voluntary compliance. The obvious
advantages for an industry are the flexibility in negotiating targets
56. Certain covenants, such as the DECLARATION OF INTENT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FOR THE PRIMARY METALS

INDUSTRY (1991), contain very specific emission levels, percentages of reduction,
and allowable waste flow.
57.

DECLARATION OF INTENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY FOR THE PRIMARY METALS INDUSTRY, Eng. trans., at 5 (1991).

58. Forty-five percent of the industries spontaneously name "legal obligations"
as the most important reason for investing in environmental measures. Much
lower score the social responsibility of the industry (20%), the reputation or
environmental image (12%), avoidance of damage claims (4%), or pressure by
NGOs (2%). In this same poll, 89% stated that legislative measures are at least
of "some importance." MISSET's MILIEU MAGAZINE, Oct. 1991, at 48.
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and the absence of coercive legislation. The advantages for the
government include a speedier achievement of required targets that
may otherwise take years to legislate as well as the voluntary
commitment of the industry. The negative aspects are voiced by
the environmental organizations, such as the Netherlands Society
for Nature and Environment (Stichting Natuur en Milieu),59 who
object to the use of covenants because of the lack of democratic
process, the juridical confusion as to their legal status, and the
impossibility of enforcing stricter measures once the covenant is in
place--objections that do not exist with ordinary legislation. The
strongest objections to the use of covenants may be the legitimation
of the wishes and desires of industry and the subordination of the
needs of the population in having the government strictly enforce
environmental objectives. Environmental organizations recognize
the greatest danger as the government's failure to enact stricter
legislation in furtherance of their environmental plans once a
covenant has been negotiated. For example, Article 3.14 of the
Civil Code provides that "[a] power which is due someone
according to civil law may not be exercised in violation of the
codified or unwritten rules of public law." 6 Environmental
organizations have interpreted this article to mean that the
covenants would restrict government in enacting and enforcing
6
stricter environmental goals because of the covenants. 1
Nevertheless, the Dutch government has with success
entered into several covenants with industrial sectors on a national

59. Letter to the author, dated Oct. 26, 1993.
60. See, e.g., Netherl.C.C., bk.3, art.14 (BW. Boek 3, Art.14): "Een bevoegdheid
die iemand krachtens het burgerlijk recht toekomt, mag niet worden uitgeoefend
in strijd met geschreven of ongeschreven regels van publiekrecht."
61. AJ.M. van den Biggelaar, director Stichting Natuur en Milieu (Society for
Nature and Environment), Address at Commission of Environmental
Management of the Second Chamber, Feb. 20, 1992. [hereinafter Biggelaar].
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basis.62 In addition to the three major, nation-wide covenants, the
government has negotiated several individual covenants with many
of the target groups listed in the NEPP. As explained above,
covenants with nationwide participation are aimed at implementing
governmental policy on a faster track than would be possible
through legislation. Often such covenants are meant to be of a
temporary nature to be replaced by later laws or regulations that
would default the covenant. Provided this is true, covenants play
an important role in implementing the environmental plans of the
government, and the environmental organizations are merely
"crying wolf." The use of covenants is expressed in the NEPP:
Consultation with target groups may result in
conclusions being expressed in covenants. Future
environmental policy will make use of this
instrument particularly in the following cases:
- if the aim set cannot be reached easily or quickly
enough by imposing regulations;
- where, in the exploratory phase of a particular
problem and preceding regulation, covenants can
allow preliminary agreements favorable to the
environment to be made;
- where, prior to regulation, a covenant is made by
which the content of the future regulations will be
used as far as possible as a basis;
- where existing regulations are supplemented or
tightened up in a covenant. 63

62. See, e.g., PACKAGING COVENANT (June 1991); PRIMARY METALS COVENANT
(March 1992); CHEMICAL INDUSTRY COVENANT (March 1993). A covenant with
greenhouse industry, concerning the discharge of effluent of 4500 farmers in the
"Westland", or 40% of Dutch greenhouse industry, was repealed in October,
1992.
63. See NEPP, supra note 6, at ch. 6, § 6.4.3 (regarding cooperation with target
groups).
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The NEPP further provides that covenants can be set up
between businesses and environmental or consumer organizations
without government participation. If satisfactory results are
reached by this method, further regulations may not be imposed.
Dutch law does not provide any rules regulating
environmental covenants. Essentially, a covenant is a contract, or
a negotiated agreement between the government (or other party)
and an industry. The Dutch Supreme Court has repeatedly
affimned that governments may conclude contracts in a civil
capacity with regard to the exercise of their discretionary powers
under public law.64 In 1990, the Supreme Court held in the
Windmill case that the government may only use civil law
instruments for environmental purposes if such use does not
unacceptably foil the effectiveness of the environmental public law
instruments.65 In other words, if the same result could have been
reached under public law, the covenant would not be acceptable.
Where, however, a covenant reaches results that have not been
codified, and are in effect more stringent than the existing laws,
such covenants should be given due effect.
A possible conflict may arise when permits are issued based
upon covenants rather than existing law. The Supreme Court is not
competent to hear appeals against environmental permits. Appeals
should be heard by the Council of State (Raad van State), and in
the Hydro Agri case this Council ruled that an environmental
permit must be issued with due observance of the most recent
environmental views available at the time of issue, disregarding
undertakings by the government in covenants or earlier permits
disregarded.66 This leaves industry in a substantially uncertain
position as to the enforcement of a covenant, because the

64. See NAUTA

DUTILH,

supra note 45, at 22.

65. Judgment of January 26, 1990, (De Staat der Nederlanden v. Windmill
Holland BV), RvdW 1990.36, NJ 1990/408 (Neth.).
66. See NAUTA DUTILH, supra note 45, at 22.
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government may decide to enact stricter legislation prior to the
expiration of the covenant. The question arises whether the
industry can enforce a covenant against the government, an issue
which has not yet been decided. Should the government default
due to a violation of public duties even as a result of unforeseen
circumstances, it becomes liable for damages. Unanswered
questions remain as to liability to industry where the government
defaults because of restrictions imposed by EC directives or
regulations.67
It is unclear whether a regulation can be
implemented through a covenant. This question may become an
issue if the Dutch Packaging Covenant proves to be in conflict with
the European eco-management and audit scheme. 68
C.

The European Eco-Audit Scheme

On March 6, 1992, the European Commission proposed a
Council Regulation allowing voluntary participation by companies
in the industrial sector in a Community eco-management and audit
scheme. This scheme was approved by the European Parliament
on January 19, 1993.69 It was established to evaluate and improve
the environmental performance of .industries and make this

67. The European Community has two primary types of legislative acts,
directives and regulations. A regulation is directly applicable in all member
states, and has immediate unconditional legal effect. It is law in the member
states from the moment of issuance, binding upon all individuals, business
organizations and governments. A directive establishes Community policy. It
is then left to the member states to implement the directive in whatever way is
appropriate to their national legal system. Only those directives that establish
clear and unconditional legal norms and do not leave normative discretion to the
member states are of direct effect. They can not be used to challenge private
activities.
68. Council Regulation 1836/93,

1993 OJ (L 168) (allowing voluntary

participation by companies in the industrial sector in a Community
eco-management and audit scheme). [hereinafter Regulation 1836193].
69. Id.
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information available to the public. A participating company will
be rewarded by an official listing and will be given permission to
use the Eco-audit logo on company publications, letterheads, etc.
Once an audit has been carried out, the company must issue an
environmental statement, written in non-technical form so the
general public can obtain a detailed assessment of all significant
environmental issues, activities, programs and objectives. The
Regulation came into force on July 13, 1993 and applies as of
April 10, 1995.70 EC countries are required to enact legislation
effectuating the Regulation.7
The Netherlands as yet has no such legislation, but does
have similar objectives in place. In 1989, the government issued
a policy document on internal environmental care systems, which
aimed at voluntary implementation by 1995 of an environmental
management system for a group of about 10,000 companies with
a high potential to pollute the environment. A further group of
250,000 companies, with a lesser potential to pollute, should have
a partial system in place. Usually, these undertakings are contained
in a covenant. As of February, 1993, sixty percent of companies
with more than 500 employees had introduced such a system, as
well as thirty-four percent of the food industry, and thirty percent
of "services", such as waste removal and waste processing
companies. The overall compliance stood at about twenty-one
percent.72
Although the government has conceded that its goal of
having full compliance by 1995 will probably not be reached, the
use of covenants does not seem to be an adverse factor. Since
such a system will only work if it is integrated into a company's
total management, there is no single system that will work for all

70. Id. at art. 21.
71. Id. at art. 16. Member States shall take appropriate legal or administrative
measures in case of non-compliance with the provisions of this Regulation.
72. 16 INT'L ENV. REP. (BNA) 125, 126 (Feb. 24, 1993).
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companies. Specifically, the use of a covenant seems to leave the
industry free to tailor these systems to their own needs, whereas
legislation would impose more rigid regulations.
D.

Enforcement

The fact that Dutch law does not provide any rules,
regulating covenants may ultimately render the use of the covenant
in environmental law undemocratic and unchallengeable. Like
most civil law countries, the Netherlands have two strictly
separated legal systems, administrative and civil enforcement. The
latter includes contract and tort actions for damages, the former
criminal enforcement. Most covenants contain a clause which
make them enforceable as a contract according to (Dutch) civil
law.73 They may also contain articles as to the settlement of
disputes.74
Challenges to the validity of a covenant may come from
third parties, alleging that a covenant is unlawful or undemocratic
on the grounds that the normal legislative process has been
bypassed. Challenges could also come from excluded competitors
in the same industrial branch. They may claim that pressure or an
industrial boycott may ultimately force them into a position where
they have no choice but to comply with the covenant, even when
they were not part of the negotiations. As such, a covenant may
be in conflict with European antitrust and competition law. 75

73. See, e.g., Packaging Covenant, art. 25 (1991).

74. See id. at art. 20, which provides for Arbitration in accordance with the
regulations of the Dutch Arbitration Institute in case of a dispute. A dispute
exists if "one of the Parties notifies the other by Registered Letter of that fact."
75. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan 1, 1958, art.
85(1), 298 UNTS 11 (1957). This article deals with concerted business practices,
business agreements and trade association decisions. When these have the
potential to affect trade between member states and have the object or effect of
preventing, restricting or distorting competition within the Community, such

236

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 4

Thus far, no attempts have been made to invoke EC competition
law to limit the use of covenants, and a full discourse hereof is
beyond the scope of this article.
Because industrial activity without a permit is prohibited in
the Netherlands, when a company, individually or as part of a
target group, has entered into a covenant agreement with the
government, issuance of a permit depends on compliance with the
terms of the covenant. It is thus necessary to discuss enforcement
of permits before the legal status of covenants can be discussed.
Virtually every written decision ("beschikking") by public
authorities may be appealed under the Administrative Decisions
Appeals Act ("Wet AROB"). 7 6 Appeal is open to every person or
company having a direct interest in the matter. Hence, permits are
open to court proceedings under the Act, where they have been
challenged for violation. For instance, once an environmental
organization has tested the permit against possible infringement
with existing law, policy, or international treaty, or has evidence of
the company violating the requirements of the permit, it may invite
the responsible agency to issue enforcement orders. Under Art.
18.14 of the EMA, anyone may invite a competent agency to issue
enforcement orders. Such orders (or the decision not to issue
them) are a "beschikking," which is open to appeal under the Act.
The importance of being able to institute proceedings under the Act
is the short term of appeal and the inclination of the Council of
State to substitute its judgment for that of the executive.
On the other hand, civil courts may offer legal recourse in
matters where no administrative court is competent to hear the
case. Accordingly, violations of permit conditions may be enforced
criminally under the Economic Offenses Act ("Wet Economische

business activities are deemed incompatible with the Common Market and
prohibited. Regulation 17 (1959-1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87) confers investigatory
powers in the European Commission to conduct studies and to determine when
violations of the competition law provisions of Articles 85 or 86 occur.
76. See

NAUTA

DUTILH, supra note 45, at 27-29.
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Delicten"), which gives the public prosecutor the right to obtain
provisional court orders for the closure of a plant, the appointment
of a supervisory manager, or the forfeiture of profits gained from
the offense." The public prosecutors are cooperating actively
with the agencies, which is leading to an increased number of court
cases and convictions. Criminal enforcement measures may be
taken alongside enforcement measures under administrative law.
If a permit condition is violated, no further proof of fault is needed.
The reverse is not true: even if permit holders comply with
environmental permit, their conduct may still give rise to
78
liability.
In the case of covenants there is usually no administrative
recourse available, leaving open a limited option of enforcement in
the district courts. On the other hand, if a covenant is violated, the
question remains how third parties can obtain standing.79 A
distinction must be made between so called "gentleman's
agreements," which impose general obligations without indicating
which action specific companies must take or identifying how
compliance is to be measured, and specific covenants, which by
their terms, impose contractual obligations. It seems the former
lack concreteness, whereas the latter would only seem to bind the
companies which are party to them. However, in the Unidek case,
the Counsel of State decided that a covenant between the permitissuing authority and a company regarding the termination of
environmental problems caused by the company, cannot be called
upon to stop third parties from requesting the use of legislation to

77. Id. at 30.
78. See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Lekkerkerker, NJ 1972/753, (H.R. 1972, nr. 278)
(shipyard which operated dump with official permit liable for damages where
waste attracted birds and destroyed neighboring orchard).
79. Pieter Winsemius, EnvironmentalContractsand Covenants:New Instruments
for a Realistic Environmental Policy?, 4 TIJDSCHRIFr VOOR MILIEU
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID 89 [ENVT'L LIABILITY L. REV.] (1993).
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enforce such termination.8°
This seems to open up a door to enforcement, however,
only in cases where subsequent legislation has been passed. In
particular, it is interesting to look at both the Primary Metals
Covenant and the covenant with the chemical industry. These
covenants were passed to ensure the implementation of internal
environmental care systems and to reduce all emissions by
substantial percentages. Both mention the need for long-term
certainty of emission levels in order to enable the industry to
determine the requisite investments.
As a trade-off, the
government has undertaken to refrain from passing laws and from
the intermediate raising of standards.81 Indeed, these restrictions,
combined with the fact that the process may be regarded as
unlawful or undemocratic in that they bypass the normal legislative
or regulatory process, may well doom the use of the covenant as
a means of fast-track enforcement of environmental policies.
Uncertainty on the part of the industry in enforcement of a
covenant through the governmental escape hatch of unforeseen
circumstances may well have the effect of shying the industry away
from engaging in voluntary agreements.
Since the use of
covenants, at least on a temporary basis or if strictly enforceable
against third parties, may well be more efficient in achieving
reasonable results with the cooperation of industry, the government
should be allowed sufficient leeway to proceed on this novel path.
V. THE UNITED STATES
Industries and government in the Netherlands are generally
more accustomed to negotiation and cooperation than in the United
States, where lobbying is a major form of communication.
Whereas it is inherent in the character of the Netherlands to seek
a negotiated compromise between extremes, in the United States

80. See Biggelaar, supra note 61, at 6.
81. See

NAUTA DUTILH,

supra note 45, at 21.
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such adversarial viewpoints are decided primarily in courts of law.
Inherently, the American legal system allows both parties
to conduct virtually unlimited discovery. Thereby environmental
groups obtain a deeper insight into industrial motives than
presumably achieved under a voluntary negotiation process. In the
civil systems, the judge requests evidence as she finds necessary,
and the parties are not necessarily informed of each other's
evidence. Further, economical blocking statutes ensure that vital
industrial information may not be disclosed. It is thus more
advantageous for an environmental organization or a government
agency to negotiate in a civil system and to file suit in the
American system, to acquire a maximum of information. At the
same time, the necessity to seek redress in a court also breeds
widespread suspicion as to each other's motives.
Hence, the ensuing effect in the United States usually is that
once an Act has been promulgated by Congress, very little room is
left for negotiated agreements between potential adversarial parties.
Accordingly, this section of the article will investigate the
possibility of using the concept of negotiated covenants between
the Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] and the
industry.
In early 1983, the EPA announced in the FederalRegister
that it was beginning a project to explore the extent to which
negotiations among interested parties could serve as an alternative
to its current rule making process, an alternative that would better
conserve time and resources and minimize litigation.12 The first
and (to the author's knowledge) only attempt the EPA has made to
use negotiated standards as an alternative to rule making was under
the Toxic Substances Control Act [hereinafter TSCA]. s3
TSCA was enacted in response to what Congress had
perceived as unreasonable risks associated with the increasing
82. Toxic Substances Control Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 7494-7495 (1983) (currently
codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (1995)).
83. Toxic Substances Control Act, U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (1993).
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marketing of untested chemical products. TSCA provides for EPA
issuance of rules requiring testing of chemicals, to be carried out
and financed by the manufacturers or processors of these
chemicals.84 In section 2603(e) of TSCA, Congress mandates an
expert panel of government scientists, the Interagency Testing
Committee [hereinafter ITC], which is to select and recommend to
the EPA a list of those chemicals whose potential risks to health
and the environment are determined to warrant "priority
85
consideration by the agency for the promulgation of a rule.,
Industrial representatives did not participate in this committee.
According to TSCA, the EPA was required within 12 months after
the first inclusion of the substances in the list to "either initiate a
rulemaking proceeding under subsection(a) . . . or if such a
proceeding is not initiated within such period, publish in the
Federal Register the . . . reason for not initiating such a
proceeding."86
The controversy began when the EPA announced in the
Federal Register that it would not consider accepting voluntary
testing programs, to be negotiated by the industry.87 The EPA
announced that such negotiations were to replace the initiating of
a rulemaking proceeding. The stated policy of the EPA was that
such agreements would be more expeditious in achieving the
required results than top-down promulgated measures. The whole
program was strictly planned according to a weekly schedule,
whereby at ten and sixteen weeks after the ITC designation, public
meetings were scheduled. After week sixteen, if the EPA
determined that testing was necessary, the Agency was to begin
work on a test rule, and to simultaneously invite industries to
84. Id. at § 2603.
85. Id. at § 2603(e)(1)(A).
86. Id. at § 2603(e)(1)(B).
87. For the Agency's response to testing, see 46 Fed. Reg. 53775 (1981) and 47
Fed. Reg. 335 (1982).
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initiate proceedings for the purpose of developing a negotiated
testing program. Eight weeks after that, the ITC and industry were
to reach a preliminary agreement on a testing program. The EPA
was to publish acceptable proposals and resulting comments were
to be reviewed before publication of the EPA's final decision to
adopt a negotiated voluntary testing agreement. By 1984, the EPA
had not initiated any rulemaking proceedings and had accepted the
voluntary testing programs as negotiated with industry. On August
28, 1994, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. [hereinafter
NRDC] and other filed suit.88 NRDC claimed, among other
things, that the "EPA violated the TSCA by accepting negotiated
voluntary testing programs instead of proposing formal test rules
(Claims One to Four)." 9 Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(2),
"any person may commence a civil action . . . against the
Administrator to compel the Administrator to perform any act or
duty under this chapter which is not discretionary. ' 90 The central
issue in this case was whether the EPA's implementation of TSCA
satisfied the statutory mandate to either initiate rulemaking or to
publish the EPA's reasons for not initiating such proceedings. After
an initial discussion concerning the background and the process of
the negotiated agreements, the court held that TSCA compelled the
EPA to promulgate rules, and that such rulemaking was therefore
not discretionary. Furthermore, the court strongly disapproved of
the agency's practice of pursuing negotiated consent agreements in
lieu of formal test rules:
I can find no support for EPA's decision to utilize
negotiated testing agreements instead of the statutorilyprescribed initiation of rulemaking proceedings either
on the face of the statute or based on some vague
88. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 595 F.Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). [hereinafter "Natural Resources"].

89. Id. at 1259.
90. Toxic Substances Control Act, supra note 82, at § 2619(a)(2).
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assertion of agency discretion. 'The agency charged
with implementing the statute is not free to evade the
unambiguous directions of the law merely for
administrative convenience'.

.

. [I]n the more than

seven years since TSCA's enactment... EPA has yet
to finalize a single test rule. Congress could not have
intended or envisioned this result.91(citations omitted).
It seems that the major dilemma the court faced was the
informality and uncertainty of whether the substance of negotiated
testing agreements were judicially reviewable where the Act
specifically provided for review in the Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
The problem, aside from the lack of standards and reviewability,
was that no specific rules had been formulated.
Whereas TSCA specifically provided for a "substantial evidence"
standard, 93 presumably negotiated agreements could only be
reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA]
using the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to review final agency
action. 94

Review under the APA presumes that the negotiated
agreements constitute "final action." Notably, the court addressed
this problem by stating that, since the EPA motive for negotiating
consent agreements in the first place was the expediency in
providing the required data, it would be "a straightforward task to
incorporate existing voluntary programs into statutory test rules." 95
It is important to note that neither the plaintiffs nor the
court objected to the process of negotiated rules: "I agree that the

91. Natural Resources, supra note 88, at 1261.
92. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2618.
93. Id. at § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i).
94. Natural Resources, supra note 88, at 1262.
95. Id.
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negotiated programs without rulemaking cannot be sanctioned
under TSCA, though negotiation to determine appropriate test
protocols as well as other relevant criteria certainly is not only
permissible but indeed preferable to blind, often impractical,
bureaucratic blundering. 9' 6 The court clearly sanctioned the
negotiation process and left open the option of negotiated programs
without rulemaking under other (Environmental) Acts such as those
that do not specifically provide for review or, alternatively, provide
for review under the same standard as the APA. In the latter case,
where there is no difference in the standard, and where the
negotiated consent agreements are designated as the equivalent of
final rules, much can be said for the use of such covenants. In
fact, the EPA has successfully negotiated several consent
agreements, and has made them enforceable as "orders", issued
under 15 U.S.C. § 2614(1). Thus, manufacturers and/or processors
who violate consent agreements will be subject to criminal and/or
civil liability under section 2615 of the Act; the EPA can invoke
the remedies available under section 2616; and citizens can file
civil actions to enforce consent agreements as prescribed in section
2619.97
The EPA has cautiously continued to use the negotiation
process as a basis for rule-making. In 1986, the EPA announced
that it considered establishing a new advisory committee under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act [hereinafter FACA]. Under the
FACA, the EPA can only establish an advisory committee, if, after
consultation with the Administrator of the General Services
Administration [hereinafter GSA], the Agency determines that
establishment of the committee is in the public interest in
connection with the performance of duties imposed on the EPA by
law. The Committee's purpose would be to negotiate issues
leading to a notice of proposed rulemaking for regulations under

96. Id.
97. 3

H. ROGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
§ 6.6 at 426 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
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the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.98
The EPA established a four-point agenda which, if satisfied,
would be appropriate for the use of negotiations as a regulatory
process. To qualify under EPA's selection criteria, an item must:
(a) be at pre-proposal stage of development; (b) have a relatively
small number of identifiable parties, in an appropriate balance and
mix, who have a good faith interest in negotiating a consensus; (c)
present a limited number of related issues for which sufficient
information is available for resolution; and (d) have a time factor
that lends some urgency to the issuing of regulations.
Shortly after the EPA established their agenda, the Agency
had successfully conducted three regulatory negotiations, with a
fourth one pending, under the Clean Air Act and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. In 1990, Congress
enacted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act [hereinafter NRA] which
establishes a framework for the conduct of negotiated rulemaking
and encourages agencies to use the process to enhance the informal
rulemaking process. 99 The NRA codifies the four points the EPA
had used during the 1980s, adding, among others that:
-there is a reasonable likelihood that a committee will reach
a Consensus on the proposed rule within a fixed period of
time; Consensus is defined as a unanimous concurrence
among the interests represented on the committee. The
committee may agree to define consensus to mean a general
but not unanimous concurrence, or agree upon another
definition.
-the negotiated rulemaking procedure will not unreasonably
delay the notice of proposed rulemaking and the issuance of
a final rule;
-the agency, to the maximum extent possible, consistent
with the legal obligations of the agency, will use the

98. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 25401 (1986).
99. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 581-90 (1993).
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consensus of the committee with respect to the proposed
rule as the basis for the rule proposed by the agency for
notice and comment.
Most recently, in 1992 and 1993, the EPA announced
Advisory Committees on various sections of the Clean Air Act.1°0
On February 1, 1993, the Sierra Club filed suit against the EPA for
missing the November 1992 deadline for promulgating regulations
for control of emissions from non-road sources. In settling the
dispute, the EPA has agreed on a two phase plan, whereby phase
two regulations will be conducted through regulatory negotiations.
VI. CONCLUSION

The use of negotiation to further environmental goals has
certain major advantages. It allows the government to make an
informed final decision, which is certainly preferable to blind,
At the same time, it allows for
bureaucratic blundering.
traditionally adversarial groups such as industry and environmental
organizations to negotiate beforehand on the necessity and
desirability of achieving sustainable development. A further
advantage is that public disclosure during the process makes
possible close oversight by academics and other interested
observers. Finally, participation in the negotiation process will
alleviate at least some of the suspicion that ordinarily characterizes
the process of rule-making. Yet, as discussion of the process in the
United States has demonstrated, it is important to develop a strict
time frame for establishing the final agreement, whether classified
as a rule or a covenant. Both the time-frame and the final

100. See Clean Air Act, Tit. I, § 183(e), 57 Fed. Reg. 31473 (1992) (on

emissions of VOC into the ambient air from consumer and commercial products,
whether representatives from the Industry, the Consumers, Federal Agencies,

State and Local Representatives of Air Pollution Agencies, and Environmental
groups participated); Clean Air Act, Tit. I, § 213, 58 Fed. Reg. 34389 (1993) (on
emissions from small nonroad spark-ignited engines 25 HP and below).
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agreement must be made enforceable, if necessary, in a court of
law. While broad participation will make it very unlikely that the
final agreement will be challenged, the chances that negotiations
will collapse in a seemingly endless discussion are very real,
especially if one or more parties to the process become pressured
in giving up too much of its own goals.
In the Netherlands, where the covenant seems to be
established as an alternative for a government-promulgated final
rule, such enforcement standards will need to be developed and be
made accessible to all interested parties. In the United States, it
may eventually be possible that the current process be partly
replaced by the negotiated covenant. The importance of negotiated
agreements is the realization that interested groups do have a
positive contribution to make in the establishment of the various
stages of sustainable development. The fact that all interested
groups are encouraged to participate in this process
will
necessarily include people and industries from across our borders.
This concept is, because of its size and geographical position, much
more developed in the Netherlands than in the United States. As
international environmental standards become recognized, which in
turn influence national rule-making processes, the sooner "acrossthe-border participants" are invited to "our" negotiations, the better
a country is equipped to address possible friction between industry
and environmental groups. Such international negotiation may
well require an international environmental court, accessible by
interested parties, to enforce time frames and final agreements.
This planet cannot be cleaned overnight without giving up
some of the current economic levels. Industry is central to the
economies of modern societies and an indispensable motor of
growth. It is essential to developing countries to widen their
development base and meet growing needs. At the same time, both
industry and governments are beginning to realize that better
natural resource planning will, over time, allow us to produce more
with less, conserving sufficient resources to allow humans to enjoy
a healthy and productive life within nature.

